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ABSTRACT
Assessing the Homeland Security Advisory System
by
Ted Greenhalgh
Dr. David M. Hassenzahl, Thesis Committee Chair 
Professor of Environmental Studies 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Since its inception, the Department o f Homeland Security (DHS) was tasked with 
communicating local and national threat information. Over the last four years, DHS 
improved its technical ability to communicate, but many people still question its actions. 
Often it seems that regardless o f the message released by DHS, somebody will criticize 
either the message content or the timing o f the press release. This begs the question o f 
how effective is DHS at delivering messages and if it can be improved. Using a checklist 
o f effective communication strategies, this study evaluated eighteen DHS press releases 
that identified new threats. The study found that DHS struggles the same issues that 
traditional mass media does when reporting new risks, as well as politicizing its own 
messages. By loading terrorism messages with vague information, DHS forced the 
audience to reach its own conclusions about the risks, leaving reports vulnerable to 
partisan reaction.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Following the tragic events o f September 11, 2001, perceived weaknesses in the 
government’s structure led to the creation o f the Department o f Homeland Security 
(DHS). In its mission statement, DHS recognizes the difficulty it faces and sees its 
mission as a learning process not only for the Department, but for the public as well: 
“Ready.gov is a common sense framework designed to launch a process o f learning 
about citizen preparedness. One o f the primary mandates o f the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security is to educate the public, on a continuing basis, about how to be 
prepared in case o f a national emergency -  including a possible terrorist attack.” 
(www.ready.gov, 2006)
Tasked with not only protecting the public, but also keeping it aware of possible threats, 
both natural and man-made, DHS created the Ready.gov web site (www.ready.gov, 2006) 
and the Homeland Security Advisory System (www.dhs.gov, 2006).
The Ready.gov site targets individual and organization preparedness, offering visitors 
detailed instructions on how to make emergency plans, prepare resources, and receive 
information during times o f emergency. True to its mission statement, DHS continues to 
develop and improve the Ready.gov site. In 2006 DHS overhauled their web site twice, 
attempting to create a more professional and accessible resource for the public.
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Earlier incarnations of the Ready.gov invoked antiquated cold war imagery and 
lacked user friendliness (www.ready.gov, 2005). Today the site matches the quality and 
user friendliness o f more modem web sites, like Yahoo and Google, and even includes 
sections for kids (www.yahoo.eom, 2006; www.google.com, 2006; www.ready.gov, 
2007).
The same can’t be said for the Homeland Security Advisory System, which continues 
to operate much as it has since its creation. Designed as the all-encompassing primary 
source o f information dissemination, the DHS website states that the Advisory System 
consists o f three parts. Homeland Security Threat Advisories, Homeland Security 
Information Bulletins, and the Color-coded Threat Level System (www.dhs.gov, 2006). 
Taken from their website, Homeland Security sets the following goals to accomplish 
these three tasks:
Homeland Security Threat Advisories contain actionable information about an 
incident involving, or a threat targeting, critical national networks or infrastructures or 
key assets. They could, for example, relay newly developed procedures that, when 
implemented, would significantly improve security or protection. They could also 
suggest a change in readiness posture, protective actions, or response. This category 
includes products formerly named alerts, advisories, and sector notifications. Advisories 
are targeted to Federal, state, and local governments, private sector organizations, and 
international partners.
Homeland Security Information Bulletins communicate information o f interest to the 
nation’s critical infrastructures that do not meet the timeliness, specificity, or significance 
thresholds o f warning messages. Such information may include statistical reports.
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periodic summaries, incident response or reporting guidelines, common vulnerabilities 
and patches, and configuration standards or tools. It also may include preliminary 
requests for information. Bulletins are targeted to Federal, state, and local governments, 
private sector organizations, and international partners.
Color-coded Threat Level System is used to communicate with public safety officials 
and the public at-large through a threat-based, color-coded system so that protective 
measures can be implemented to reduce the likelihood or impact o f an attack. Raising the 
threat condition has economic, physical, and psychological effects on the nation; so, the 
Homeland Security Advisory System can place specific geographic regions or industry 
sectors on a higher alert status than other regions or industries, based on specific threat 
information.
While these concepts seem reasonable and practical, effectively communieating risk 
events, like natural disasters and terrorist attacks, remains an elusive goal, not only for 
federal agencies, but for most media outlets as well (Levy, et al. 1986; Crane, 1992; 
Rogers, 1999; Roche & Muskavitch, 2003). The inherent uncertainty associated with 
complex issues like risk assessment places these agencies in a difficult scenario plagued 
by a milieu of problems.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Problems with Communicating Uncertainty -  Reporting Agencies 
Even with the proliferation o f reporting on the internet, people still depend on mass 
media for most o f their news (Zucker, 1978; Singer & Endreny, 1993; Allan, 2002; Ten 
Eyck, 2002). This position of primacy o f information also carries a heavy burden of 
accuracy and completeness, often not met when trying to report new risks. Reporting 
agencies, both governmental and mass media, distribute information using a traditional 
framing of news issues approach that can hinder audience comprehension of complex 
information (Levy, et al. 1986; Crane, 1992; Rogers, 1999). The traditional framing 
approach stresses putting the most recent events first in the story and filling the rest of the 
story with whatever historical information the reporter can find quickly. Little time or 
space is devoted to putting issues into proper context which leaves the audience to filter 
the new information based on their own history and not necessarily that o f the story.
Since most readers lack any real understanding of a newly reported threat beforehand, 
this lack o f stated context invariably distorts the message (Rogers, 1999).
Journalists are expected to be reporting generalist with few specialists, especially 
terrorism specialist, even at large news agencies (Becker et al. 2000). Lacking the 
expertise to convey the uncertainty element o f the risk, journalists often over-simplify 
important information (Levy, et al. 1986; Ethiel 2002). Making matters even more
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complicated, the demographics o f the potential audience for any mass media report are 
highly variable, making it difficult for reporters to effectively craft stories that can target 
such diverse audiences. Complex issues and technical terms not fully explained tend to 
alienate less educated readers, while oversimplified explanations often omit information 
the audience considers important. Reporters need to provide complete and accurate 
information and not make assumptions about the audience or run the risk o f being 
marginalized by their readers (McAdams & Elliott 1996). Surprisingly, less than ten 
percent o f news stories provide adequate explanations o f technical terms (Long, 1995). 
Lacking the background to understand these terms or an explanation in the story, readers 
simply fail to process the facts they don’t understand or stop reading altogether.
Often, producers frame news stories out o f context with the body of the report or use 
visuals that don’t support the message reported (Rogers, 1999). Global warming 
reporting is a classic example o f this and even today, long after scientific consensus has 
been reached on the issue, most reports on the issue lead in with the phrase “controversial 
scientific theory.” Add to this that production staffs rate the quality o f a newscast based 
on technical issues like live shots and whether the reporters look professional instead of 
the quality o f information (Crane, 1992). Most news agencies operate under the mistaken 
belief that audiences are passive sponges that soak up information, which isn’t true for 
issues that raise concern among the audience (Epstein, 1995). In the past, audiences had 
to rely on mass media outlets for all their information, but that’s no longer the case. With 
easy access to the Internet, more information, both o f quality and some questionable, can 
be found with little effort. While more in-depth online content might help reporting
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
agencies fill in the gaps o f their time-limited televised coverage, internet use also allows 
for the potential spread o f misinformation from less reputable online sources.
Finally, the issue o f trust between reporting agency and audience must be considered. 
Research shows agency trust has a great effect on people’s perception o f reported risks 
(Rayner, 1988; Trumbo & McComas, 2003). If  the source o f the information lacks 
public confidence the report’s value and effect will be diminished and distorted. Many 
public agencies lack the properly trained staff to assist journalist in reporting risk issues, 
which can lead to ineffective or inaccurate stories being reported (Gursky et al., 2003). 
Reporting agencies must always strive to be as informative, accurate and as responsive as 
possible to its audience to cultivate a long lasting sense o f trust.
Problems with Communieating Uncertaintv -  The Audience 
The audience itself also presents a number o f problems. Walter Lippmann 
recognized one o f the key problems with effective communication early in the 20*’’ 
century. Everyone constructs new reality based on previous experience (Lippmann,
1922). As individuals encounter new events, they filter them through the “tiny pictures” 
in their minds before incorporating them as new knowledge. This creates a situation 
where the reporting agency not only has to address the accuracy o f the message, but how 
to correctly convey the message based on the individual’s understanding of the world. 
This creates a situation where any gaps in information are subject to the widely varying 
personal experiences o f the audience.
Cultural and demographic differences also create wide ranges o f trust and 
understanding o f messages (Slovic, 1987; Flynn et ah, 1994; Johnson, 2002). Even the 
very concept o f “risk” gets defined differently between subgroups of the audience
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(Fischoff & Slovic, 1978; Slovic, 1999; Satterfield et al., 2004). Highly educated people 
tend to understand and trust the information when learning of a new risk. Minority 
groups tend to distrust government reports and misunderstand reported risks more often. 
Women tend to perceive risks higher than men and almost universally everyone perceives 
risks higher than they would prefer (Fischoff & Slovic, 1978).
Audience focus groups cite two main areas of frustration in reading complex news 
reports; lack o f context and lack o f technical information (Rogers, 1999). People want to 
understand the world around them, but mass media often fail to deliver when it comes to 
complex subjects. Even for impossible to answer questions, like the likelihood o f a 
terrorist attack or natural disaster, people are ready to make estimates on their own 
(Fischoff & Slovic, 1978). This creates a situation where people still rely on mass media 
to get the story, but evaluate the importance of it through interpersonal channels of 
communication and social interaction (Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000).
Many personal understandings o f risk also impact risk perception. Voluntary 
exposure to a risk, familiarity with the risk, equity o f exposure to the risk, a feeling of 
control about exposure, and a belief that the risk might bring other beneficial results all 
lower risk perception (Starr, 1969; Slovic, 1987; Satterfield et ah, 2004). On the other 
hand, the catastrophic potential o f risk, a sense o f dread, and the feeling o f hopeless all 
increase risk perception. Audiences exposed to similar risk reports on a regular basis 
begin to exhibit more pronounced attitude changes toward the subject over time. At 
moderate levels o f exposure they begin to amplify the risk in their minds both 
individually and through social interaction (Gerbner, et al. 1980; Kasperson & Slovic 
1992). In some cases, people exposed to even more frequent reporting begin to
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underestimate the threat, basically becoming desensitized to any new information. Both 
o f these situations can become problematic for reporters. People already sensitive to a 
risk will tend to overreact to each new report while those who have become desensitized 
might cynically ignore the message believing the government to just be “crying wolf.” 
Problems with Communicating Uncertaintv -  The Medium 
The medium used to convey the message also creates unique problems. Newspaper 
and Internet outlets can provide space for more in-depth explanations, while radio and 
television outlets tend to create more concise reports. This creates a situation where not 
only does the reporting agency need to create different releases for each type o f outlet, it 
must also consider the restrictions each outlet imposes on its editors to ensure that critical 
information isn’t changed or removed due to presentation restraints. The same multi-page 
news release created for online or print agencies will probably be too large to telecast. 
This necessitates the production o f tailored versions o f the message that can meet both 
the time restrictions o f televised news and the audience’s need of complete information. 
Even the particular medium used to relay the information can make a difference. As 
Marshall McLuhan famously noted, “The medium is the message” (MeLuhan, 1965). 
This perceived ratio o f importance that the audience places on the medium presenting the 
risk report can also distort the message, making incomplete televised reports particularly 
vulnerable.
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CHAPTER 3
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Considering the formidable task that effectively communicating risk information is, 
it’s understandable that the DHS regularly comes under fire tfom pundits and political 
partisans. Traditional news framing leaves out details the audience wants to know, 
leaving it up to them to fill in the blanks. This makes messages coming from government 
agencies particularly vulnerable to perceived political bias. Even traditional news outlets 
have questioned the use o f Advisory System to deflect possible criticism away from the 
current executive administration. During the MSNBC news broadcast on October 6,
2005 Keith Olbermann surmised:
“Remarkably enough, Karl Rove's possible legal problems were book-ended today by 
two pieces o f terror news. Before, came a presidential speech on the war on terror. 
After, came a supposed terrorist threat to New York's subway system. Stop what 
you're thinking. It's just an amazing coincidence. The terrorists just happened to wait 
to make these threats until there's bad news about the administration that it needs to 
preempt. Just a coincidence.”
While the motives involved in changes to the Homeland Security Advisory System 
continue to be discussed across the political and editorial landscape, this study instead 
focuses on the effectiveness o f the communication strategies being used by DHS to shape
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
risk perception among the public. Arguably, research concerning how to effectively 
report uncertainty messages is nascent, however researchers from a number o f fields 
continue to study risk communication and we have some knowledge about uncertainty 
and its effects on individual and community perception. Most research findings come 
almost anecdotally and lack broad consensus between studies. Not surprisingly, most 
mass media and government reporters seem unaware o f these findings and continue to 
Ifame threats to society in traditional formats (Rogers, 1999). If the researchers haven’t 
reached agreement on what constitutes good message framing, how could a media outlet 
know which one to select?
A Framework for Communicating Uncertaintv 
Research into communicating risk and uncertainty shows some convergence into a 
general understanding o f what makes good reporting:
Determine the threat potential -  Calculating the actual risk probability is considered 
by many, perhaps falsely, to be the easiest part o f the process (Kammen & Hassenzahl, 
1999). This evaluation o f the likelihood and severity o f the event involves getting the 
best available information and using the best methods to calculate the risk (Fischoff,
1995). Audience members evaluate the importance o f the message based on the quality 
o f the methods used to determine the threat probability (Rogers, 1999). The more precise 
and detailed a method seems, the more attention the audience will give it. Placing the 
probability and method into a relevant and easily understood context also plays a role in 
audience understanding.
Most people lack the background or training to understand statistical probability 
figures and the esoteric methods o f creating them (Golding et ah, 1992; Slovic, 2000).
10
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Research shows that comparison narratives can impact audience belief (Golding et al.,
1992). This requires the reporting agency to couch the probability in more familiar terms 
which takes some finesse on the part o f the reporting agency. Telling the audiences they 
have a one in a million chance o f being affected is meaningless and obtuse. This is 
especially problematic for terrorist threats owing to the novelty o f such attacks and their 
potential for massive loss o f life. While it might be tempting to compare every new 
terrorism threat to the attacks o f 9/11 or every natural disaster to Hurricane Katrina, it’s 
not quite that simple.
Care must be taken in selection of the contextual example to ensure that the more 
common threat seems a reasonable comparison for people to make (Johnson, 2005). 
Uncertainty already places the audience in a demanding position and a poorly chosen 
context will make a difficult situation worse. Also, different demographic groups tend to 
react variably to new risks and contexts (Slovic, 1987; Flynn et al., 1994; Johnson, 2002). 
In controlled experiments o f adding narrative contexts to risk issues, the effects o f the 
narrative have been mixed (Slovic et ah, 1990; Johnson 2004). Finally, some researchers 
feel that it might be too difficult for reporters to adequately address the uncertainty 
inherent in probability, so reporters should focus on mitigation issues (Boholm, 2003).
As muddled as the research seems to be, making probability and uncertainty readily 
understandable to people is something o f a grail quest for reporters, because it’s one of 
the primary concerns audiences raise in surveys (Rogers, 1999). Some headway has been 
made in finding more effective contexts (Johnson, 2005). By simply asking what kinds 
of contexts make sense to test subjects, agencies can address many of the issues raised in 
the previous paragraph. Since government and mass media organizations routinely form
1 1
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focus study groups to evaluate their operations, this would be an ideal time to get 
feedback from audiences (Crane, 1992). While this topic still needs much research 
(Slovic et ah, 1990; Johnson, 2004), by building and sharing a functional database o f 
these acceptable comparisons reporting agencies could help each other communicate with 
their audiences more effectively.
Report the threat -  The risk should be reported using clear and unambiguous 
language. Audiences want to know details o f the situation when faced with uncertainty 
(Rogers, 1999). They want to know the location, time, and duration of the event as well 
as whom it will impact. Keeping the message accurate and to the point helps the 
audience focus on these important facts (McAdams & Elliott, 1996). People evaluate 
risks based on their understanding o f the world (Fox, 1999). Any omissions deemed 
important by the audience are filtered through this worldview and a guess generated. 
Special consideration to the medium and editorial requirements must be observed to 
ensure important information isn’t lost through editing due to lack o f space or time.
Explain what the threat means -  When people hear that their life might be in danger, 
they want answers. If the reporting agency doesn’t supply these answers directly, people 
will seek out other less reliable sources which can make a dire situation worse (Fischoff 
& Slovic, 1978; Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999). Reports should not contain complicated 
technical terms and esoteric jargon (Rogers, 1999). Anything deemed too technical for 
the average person in the report should be explained in detail (McAdams & Elliot, 1996). 
Likely questions a reasonable person might ask should also be addressed and care must 
be taken to ensure that people understand what this threat means to them, their families 
and communities.
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Give the new threat context -  In most instances, audience should be given a frame of 
reference using another more common risk event (Rogers 1999). This requires the 
reporting agency to have a working knowledge of other types o f risks and how they relate 
to the current situation. A comparison to being killed in a car crash or killed by lightning 
creates a better understanding than saying killed in a lab accident. Few people have any 
experience with lab accidents, but most are well aware o f the dangers o f driving and 
lightning. If the risk is unavoidable, like a threat to a metropolitan mass transit system, 
use comparisons to other risks that people take daily to gain some benefit (Slovic, 1987; 
Satterfield et ah, 2004). Again, many o f the context issues discussed in the probability 
section above must be carefully considered and much more research needs to be done in 
this area.
Explain mitigation strategies -  People want to know what they can do when faced 
with adversity. They want to know what actions they can take and what actions others 
are taking. The reporting agency should explain the events and indicators that precipitate 
the threat followed by what actions the audience can take to lessen their exposure to a 
risk or the effects once it does occur. Warning people about catastrophic life-threatening 
events can increase their sense o f dread dramatically, but telling them how to cope with 
the situation makes it more manageable. The research on crafting efficacious mitigation 
messages for audiences hasn’t been conclusive. Some o f the research shows a correlation 
between efficacy and action (Weinstein, 1983; Weinstein et ah, 1990) while others found 
no correlation (Svenson et al., 1985) and some found mixed results (Rimal & Real, 2003). 
It’s still worthwhile to pursue because once people feel they can cope with the risk they 
are more willing to accept it (Starr, 1969; Slovic, 1987; Satterfield et ah, 2004).
13
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Make sure people don’t feel isolated -  Due to the nature of mass media reporting 
people often feel isolated by the report, sinee they generally get their information 
individually. In the case o f a dread inducing threat, this sense o f isolation can seem 
overwhelming, causing the audience to miss important information. Reports should 
accentuate how the risk event affects the community and what agencies can help people 
during the crisis.
Research Questions
The literature indicates that when faced with a new threat, people want information.
If they can’t get this information from official sources, they’ll seek out other sources 
(Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000) or simply fill in the blanks based on their 
personal experience (Lippmann; 1922; Fox, 1999). The literature also shows that normal 
mass media approaches to reporting uncertainty, while timely and efficient, often lack a 
context that the audience can understand which reduces efficacy (Rogers, 1999). Add to 
this the difficulty of trying to identify terrorist threats, which are highly uncertain by 
nature, and it becomes obvious that traditional media methods will prove problematic for 
DHS to communicate effectively and build agency trust (Raynor, 1988). If  the agency 
crafts its messages using traditional mass media methods, it’s likely they’ll encounter the 
same types o f difficulties and limitations that continue to plague media outlets. This 
raises the following questions with respect to how the Department o f Homeland Security 
communicates with the public:
RQ] : Does the DHS employ the processes advocated by risk communication research 
or does it rely on standard mass media structures and content in presenting its messages?
14
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RQ2: Could the limitations caused by using standard mass media framing lead to 
agency mistrust by forcing the audience to fill in missing information themselves?
Using the literature as a guide of what good risk reporting should contain, this study 
examines the content o f the new threat press releases listed on the www.dhs.gov website 
to determine if  the department uses standard reporting practices that could lead to public's 
misinterpretation o f the message. If DHS already uses better reporting practices, then the 
lack of faith some have in the agency probably comes from another source.
15
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY
Using the six-point framework outlined above, this study examines the contents of 
DHS threat messages and evaluates what factors might influence audience perception.
By constructing a table that compares effective strategies and actual DHS messages any 
missing elements are identified. Compiling all these findings into a case study o f DHS 
messages should indicate effective and ineffective strategies being used by the agency. 
Armed with this new knowledge, the study suggests improvements for future agency 
communications.
This project uses an explanatory case study approach due to the difficulty of 
separating the intent o f DHS messages from the text o f the messages (Yin, 1993). This 
allows objectivity while the composite framework limits preconceived bias toward the 
DHS. To further reduce researcher bias, each message will be evaluated separately by 
three independent coders and the aggregate o f the three findings discussed.
Collection o f Data
Design
Coders use the worksheet found in Appendix A that lists the six communication 
strategies in one column, the ideal message components in the second column, the actual 
DHS message content in the third column, and then describe the clarity o f the message in 
the fourth column, for each DHS press release. Upon completion o f the worksheets, they
16
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are collected and compared by the primary researcher create an aggregate listing o f what 
the coders found in each message. Any variation between the coder’s findings is noted 
for reliability analysis. Once inter-coder reliability is established and found acceptable (a 
> 0.70), systemic trends in the messages are discussed and reporting issues noted. 
Procedure
The coders evaluate each DHS press release or news conference transcript that raised 
the color-coded National Threat Level or identified a new natural threat using the work 
sheet in Table 1. For each section the coder notes the following in the appropriate boxes:
Determine the Threat Potential - DHS Message Content: Any risk probability 
presented in the message and the method the agency used to arrive at that number. If the 
message lacks any risk probability assessment, the coder enters “none”.
Determine the Threat Potential -  Clarity: The coder rates how well they understood 
the risk probability in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at all” .
Report the Threat -  Identify Specific Threat -  DHS Message Content: The coder 
enters the threat identified in the message. If the threat isn’t identified, the coder enters 
“none”.
Report the Threat -  Identify Specific Threat -  Clarity: The coder rates how well they 
understood the specific threat in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
Report the Threat -  Identify Specific Location -  DHS Message Content: The coder 
enters the potential areas that the threat might impact listed in the message. If the 
location isn’t identified, the coder enters “none”.
17
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Report the Threat -  Identify Specific Location -  Clarity: The coder rates how well 
they understood the threatened location in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not 
at all”.
Report the Threat -  Expected Duration -  DHS Message Content: The coder enters the 
threat’s expected duration information from the message. If the duration isn’t listed, the 
coder enters “none”.
Report the Threat -  Expected Duration -  Clarity: The coder rates how well they 
understood the threat’s duration in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
Report the Threat -  Population at Risk -  DHS Message Content: The coder enters 
what populations the message says are potentially at risk. If the message doesn’t state a 
population, the coder enters “none”.
Report the Threat -  Population at Risk -  Clarity: The coder rates how well they 
understood the what population was at risk in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or 
“not at all”.
Explain What It Means -  Jargon -  DHS Message Content: The coder enters any 
unexplained acronyms or jargon that appears in the message. If all esoteric terms were 
explained or the message didn’t contain any, the coder enters “none” .
Explain What It Means -  Jargon -  Clarity: The coder rates how well they understood 
the jargon used in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
Explain What It Means -  Technical Terms -  DHS Message Content: The coder lists 
any unexplained technical terms contained in the message. If all technical terms were 
explained or the message didn’t contain any, the coder enters “none”.
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Explain What It Means -  Technical Terms -  Clarity: The coder rates how well they 
understood the technical terms used in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at 
all”.
Give the Threat Context -  DHS Message Content: The coder enters any common risk 
use in the report to make the new threat more understandable. If a more common risk 
wasn’t used in the report the eoder enters “none”.
Give the Threat Context -  Clarity: The coder rates how well they understood the risk 
using the more common context used in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at 
all”.
Explain Mitigation Strategies -  How to Minimize Exposure -  DHS Message Content: 
The coder lists any steps that the report says people should do to avoid or lessen the 
effects o f the new threat. If the report contained no minimizing or avoidance steps the 
coder enters “none”.
Explain Mitigation Strategies -  How to Minimize Exposure -  Clarity: The eoder rates 
how well they understood the steps to minimize or avoid the risk in the message as either 
“good”, “vague”, or “not at all” .
Explain Mitigation Strategies -  What to do if  Exposed -  DHS Message Content: The 
coder lists the steps the report says people should take if  exposed to the new risk. If the 
report contains no information on what to do if  somebody is exposed to the risk the eoder 
enters “none”.
Explain Mitigation Strategies -  What to do if  Exposed -  Clarity: The eoder rates how 
well they understood what they should do if  exposed to the threat in the message as either 
“good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
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Explain Mitigation Strategies -  What Others Will be Doing -  DHS Message Content: 
The coder lists what the report says other people and agencies are doing about the threat. 
If the report didn’t list this information, the coder enters “none”.
Explain Mitigation Strategies -  What Others Will be Doing -  Clarity: The coder rates 
how well they understood what steps other people and agencies would be doing about the 
threat in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
Make Sure People Don’t Feel Isolated -  Community Affected -  DHS Message 
Content: The coder lists the community building statements contained in the message. If 
the message didn’t contain any community building statements, the coder enters “none”.
Make Sure People Don’t Feel Isolated -  Community Affected -  Clarity: The coder 
rates the effectiveness o f the message to build community ties as either “good”, “vague”, 
or “not at all” .
Make Sure People Don’t Feel Isolated -  Getting More Help -  DHS Message Content: 
The coder lists any phone numbers, contact agencies, and websites where the message 
says people can find more information or seek help. If the message didn’t have any of 
these sources, the coder enters “none”.
Make Sure People D on’t Feel Isolated -  Getting More Help -  Clarity: The coder rates 
the message’s listing o f additional help sources as “good”, “vague”, or “not at all” .
Treatment o f the Data
After the outside coders have completed the message worksheets, the primary 
researcher collects and compares them to their own worksheets. Using a simple binary (0 
for no match, 1 for a match) ranking system the primary researcher notes whether the 
outside coder agrees with them. For each worksheet comparison the primary researcher
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generates and records a straight percentage o f coder agreement, a Pearson’s Correlation 
between datasets, and a Cronbach’s alpha to determine the relationship between the coder 
responses and inter-coder reliability of the instrument (Cronbach, 1951). Once all the 
worksheets have been evaluated, the primary researcher also records the average o f those 
three tests for the entire case study o f messages. Pearson’s Correlation is used to measure 
the tendency of outside coder results to follow those o f the primary researcher as well as 
provide data for Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal 
reliability o f the instrument. It’s necessary to test the instrument and coder findings 
because o f the novelty o f this approach. None of the coders are experts in risk 
communication and the instrument has never been used before.
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS
During the initial analysis o f the data it became apparent that it would be more 
informative to separate the DHS messages into two categories, Hurricane Warnings and 
Terrorism Warnings, since they follow a different content formats. Casual observation of 
the messages doesn’t identify this trend, so it’s not possible to determine if  this 
divergence was intentional. Regardless, the Pearson’s Correlation and Cronbach’s alpha 
for the groups combined or separated were very good (0.80 -  1.0 and 0.94 -  1.0 
respectively).
All o f the hurricane warnings in table 1 lacked any kind o f threat probability, which 
was a curious omission, because this information was readily available on the 
government’s National Hurricane Center website (www.nhc.noaa.gov, 2006). This same 
website also details the methods used in determining the hurricane threat potentials, 
another content element missing from all the messages. None o f the messages attempted 
to generate a better understanding o f the probability with a more common threat. Not 
surprisingly, by omitting all probability information in every message, the threat 
probability sections all lacked clarity.
Things improved considerably when the messages reported the threat. All o f the 
messages identified the hurricane threat and some even included wind speed 
classification information. The location information was easy to understand, even
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considering the large areas that can be affected by a hurricane. All o f the hurricane 
duration information was expressed in vague terms, like “weeks following landfall.” 
Although it wasn’t specifically stated in every message what populations were at risk, it 
was easy to deduce in all the messages what people were at risk. Despite the duration 
vagueness, all the messages reported the threat clearly.
Most o f the hurricane warnings avoided technical jargon and on the rare occasion 
when the reports used a technical term, they explained it. Combined with good reporting 
content, this made the messages easy to understand. The only other context that was used 
to explain the new threat was another hurricane, which didn’t make the threat context 
noticeable clearer. Still, the coders all reported they could follow the hurricane messages 
and understand them.
Mitigation strategies were solid for the most part. All of the messages told people 
how to minimize their risk and what government agencies would be doing during the 
crisis. Almost all explained what people affected by the storm should do for assistance 
and self-preservation. Community building was rarely (only 25%) attempted. Most press 
releases contained useful listings to relief agencies and locations for additional 
information, but a quarter o f the messages didn’t have any contact information at all.
One curious finding was the lack o f a press release warning for Hurricane Katrina on 
the DHS website. There had been previous warnings for other hurricanes and warnings 
for hurricanes after, but none for Katrina. In the months following the devastation caused 
by the storm, DHS had dozens o f Katrina-related press releases, making the warning 
omission even more notable.
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Table 1 Percentage o f Hurricane Warning Messages Containing New Framework
Content. Listed j y  Evaluation Criteria (rows) and Findings (columns).
Framework
Criteria Message Element





Risk Probability 0% 0% 10094 10094
Method Used 0% 0% 10094 10094
Probability Context 0% 0% 10094 10094
Clarity 0% 0% 10094 10094
Report the 
threat
Identify Threat 100% 0% 0% 10094
Identify Location 100% 0% 0% 10094
Expected Duration 0% 100^6 0% 88%
Population at Risk 100% 0% 0% 10094





100% 0% 0% 10094





0% 0% 10094 96%




Minimize Risk 100% 0% 0% 96%
Actions if  Affected 63% 12% 25% 83%




Community Aspect 25% 0% 75% 88%
Help or 
Information
75% 0% 2594 96%
8 messages: Cronbach’s a : Agreement = 96%.
The terrorism warning messages data from table 2 shows a slightly different picture. 
All o f the messages contained the ubiquitous National Threat Level of either 
Orange/High Risk o f attack or Red/Severe Risk o f attack. While the nominal approach 
indicated a sense of probability, it was still considered somewhat vague and clouded 
message clarity. 75% of the messages mentioned some of the methods used to arrive at 
the new probability o f attacks. These varied from “consensus o f national terror experts” 
to “increased chatter” and in most cases didn’t make the threat potential any clearer.
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None o f the messages attempted to frame the probability in an easier to understand 
context.
Unlike the hurricane warnings, the terrorism warnings lacked speeifies when 
reporting the nature o f the threat. More than 50% of the messages deseribed the threat in 
vague terms sueh as “shadow warriors” or “unspecific threats.” Similarly, locations were 
described in very vague terms in half the messages, sometimes limiting the location to 
“anywhere in the world.” Continuing the trend, the expected durations o f the new threat 
were vague, open ended, or used political time frames like “until after the elections” or 
“up through the president’s inauguration.” Most messages laeked elarity with only 30% 
of the reports identifying the threat.
In explaining terrorism warnings DHS occasionally used unexplained jargon or 
technical terms, like “weaponized anthrax,” but 80% of the messages avoided the mistake. 
Unfortunately, these explanations didn’t improve clarity in 70% of the messages. Risk 
comparisons were only used once and the context was questionable when the anthrax 
attack was compared to the yearly flu epidemic. None o f the reports were made clearer 
using comparison contexts.
Mitigation strategies were very good for most o f the messages, with 90% o f the 
reports offering ways to lower risk exposure and all of them detailing what federal and 
state agencies would be doing to decrease the threat. Oddly, messages rarely (10%) 
offered any suggestions on what to do if  people were actually exposed to the risk. This 
contrasted with the hurricane messages which provided the information in about two- 
thirds of the reports. In 30% o f the messages some form o f community building was 
attempted and a like number o f reports offered additional sources people go use to get
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help or additional information about the threat. Again, the lack o f sources for help or 
additional information in terrorism messages was significantly different than those found 
in the hurricane warnings.
Table 2 
Content.









Risk Probability 0 % 10094 0 % 9 7 %
Method Used 0 % 7 5 % 2 5 % 9 3 %
Probability Context 0 % 0 % 10094 10094
Clarity 0 % 10094 0 % 10094
Report the 
threat
Identify Threat 4 0 % 6 0 % 0 % 9 3 %
Identify Location 5 0 % 5 0 % 0 % 9394
Expected Duration 3 0 % 3 0 % 4 0 % 8 0 %
Population at Risk 4 0 % 6 0 % 0 % 9 3 %






8 0 % 2 0 % 0 % 10094






0 % 1 0 % 9 0 % 9 3 %




Minimize Risk 9 0 % 0 % 1 0 % 8 7 %
Actions if  Affected 1 0 % 1 0 % 8 0 % 9 0 %




Community Aspect 3 0 % 6 0 % 1 0 % 8 0 %
Help or 
Information
3 0 % 0 % 7 0 % 9 3 %
10 messages: Cronbaeh’s a  = 0.96: Average Coder Agreement = 93%.
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION
Overall, the hurricane warnings look mostly eomplete and comparable with standard 
mass media reporting formats. It could be argued that the inclusion of probability 
information wasn’t necessary, but this just leaves the audience to create its own 
impression o f the probabilities (Lippmann, 1922). Research shows that people are 
perfectly willing to make a guess in the absence o f facts (Fischoff & Slovic, 1978) or 
seek out information from interpersonal social sources (Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; 
Beck, 2000). The National Hurricane Center website lists landfall location probabilities 
and storm intensity information for every hurricane it tracks, so there’s really no reason 
not to inelude the information in the press releases (www.nhc.noaa.gov, 2006). Since this 
information is readily available from a number o f other government websites it makes 
eorrecting this problem in the future trivial.
When reporting and explaining the threat, the messages are uniformly good, with the 
exception o f duration information. Durations were given in rather vague terms and the 
coders were simply confused as to what constituted actual duration information. Again, 
by making this information so vague, only makes it more likely for misinterpretation. A 
generalized version of this information can be found on the DHS and other government 
websites, but the government has a lot o f experience dealing with hurricanes. There’s no 
reason that DHS eouldn’t tailor the expected duration o f the storm and expeeted time for
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relief to arrive after each storm based on past experiences with similar storms in similar 
areas.
The lack o f more eommon risk comparisons to generate a more understandable 
context doesn’t aetually weaken hurrieane warnings. Hurricanes are one o f the more 
common natural threats people face, partieularly among those likely to be exposed to 
sueh storms. Mitigation strategies were also uniformly good, only occasionally lacking 
information on what people should do when affected by the storm. Most o f the hurricane 
warnings lacked community bonding aspects, which seems out o f place considering 
hurricanes impact entire regions and hundreds o f eommunities. By building a eonnection 
with the community before the event, agencies can lower isolation apprehension and also 
implant the idea o f working together in the storm’s wake.
Other than the ubiquitous National Threat Level changes, the terrorism warnings 
contained no other threat probability information. Taken at face value, stating there was 
a “high” or “severe” risk o f a terrorist attack seems reasonable, but compared to what? 
After being told 10 times that the risk of attack was “high” or “severe” and nothing 
happened, what should people make o f those terms? At the very best, these kinds of 
minimal probability can only be considered vague. Most reports carried a vague 
description o f the methods used to determine the threat. It might be that divulging how 
the new threat was identified would violate national security, but the ethereal nature of 
explanations offered didn’t increase understanding.
Taken together these vague messages and omissions create a situation ripe for 
personal interpretation (Lippmann, 1922). Again, research shows that people are willing 
to make a guess in the absence of facts (Fischoff & Slovic, 1978) or seek out information
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from interpersonal social sources (Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000). This can 
wildly distort the message as it’s filtered on personal and interpersonal levels without any 
real grounding and was expressed when the outside coders didn’t equate color-code 
changes with risk probability at all. It was meaningless to them.
Several times comments made by the DHS Secretary only added to this confusion by 
generating mixed messages. In press conferences announeing that they were increasing 
the National Threat Level because terrorist attacks were considered imminent, both 
Secretaries then told everyone to go about their business and basically ignore the threat. 
These kinds o f mixed messages come about because there’s no common context for 
terrorist attacks and the Secretaries apparently lacked the understanding or finesse to 
explain the nature o f low probability/high damage threats adequately. Comparing a 
terrorist attack to a rare, but well understood tragedy, could generate a more appropriate 
context. People would then know it could happen and be devastating, but probably not to 
them. For most people, this would increase their awareness o f the threat without causing 
panic behavior, which seems to be the outcome DHS wanted.
When reporting and explaining the threat, information was presented in very vague 
terms more than half the time, making it difficult to understand or follow. This again 
lowered inter-coder reliability as the coders struggled to identify what exactly DHS was 
trying to say in the messages. Again, this could be an issue o f national security and DHS 
might be parsing its words to avoid giving away too many details, but it still leaves the 
audiences guessing what the message means. Comparing the terrorism messages to the 
hurrieane messages, it’s pretty obvious that something has changed in how DHS covered 
the factual information in the reports.
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This was a little surprising, since traditionally, reporters cover the five W ’s (who, 
what, where, when, why) o f uncertainty issues fairly well (Crane, 1995). Often these 
reports were so vague it seemed DHS was saying anything could happen to anyone, 
anywhere, and at anytime. This omission of normally expected information again leads 
the audience to fill in the missing facts with guesswork (Fischoff & Slovic, 1978) and 
rumor (Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000). It also gives the impression that 
DHS is either hiding or doesn’t know the information, both of which impact agency trust 
(Rayner, 1988; Trumbo & McComas, 2003).
Presenting information framed in political terms only lends them to political 
interpretation. Saying “until after the elections” can create mistrust when just saying 
“until December” would have given a similar duration with a neutral connotation. While 
it seems trivial, DHS shouldn’t give away credibility due to sloppy writing. In the 
politically polarized environment that the agency must navigate its messages today, more 
care needs to be taken to ensure people aren’t given a reason to disbelieve the message.
Only one o f the warnings was compared to a more common risk, the yearly outbreak 
o f influenza, which was oddly compared to the spat of anthrax mail incidents. The rest 
were not compared to other common risks, but three made comparisons to the unique 
attacks o f 9/11. During one press conference, when a reporter asked Secretary Ridge to 
compare the current alert with past ones, he declined to comment. This left a number of 
important issues for the audience to determine on their own (Lippmann, 1922; Fischoff & 
Slovic, 1978), which can harm agency image as a reliable information source and create 
mixed messages in the social sphere as each person creates their own reality of the threat
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(Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000). All o f these were eurious choices, since 
none of them fit the particular context very well.
Comparing the narrowly targeted anthrax incidents to a yearly occurrence that kills 
10,000 people seems uninformed, at best. While it might be tempting to use the attacks 
o f 9/11 to impress the potential damage effects of a terrorist attack, it fails to convey 
probability well owing to its once in a lifetime uniqueness. Coupling the 9/11 attack’s 
effects with a better understood low probability event could make an effective message, 
however the agency needs to carefully conduct some research first to see if  audiences will 
accept the comparison first.
Mitigation strategies were generally covered well, with the exception o f what people 
should do if  they were affected by an attack. Most o f the information that people would 
need to know in case o f an attack are already on the DHS Ready.gov website, the agency 
just needs to include that information in future press releases. In all its messages, DHS 
very thoroughly described what it and other agencies were doing to mitigate these new 
threats, it just needs to apply that same principle to telling people what they should be 
doing during the crisis.
Some o f the community remarks were effective, but others were politically loaded 
bordering on propaganda. More neutral phasing can generate the wanted results without 
tempting the audience to discount the message as being political. The first few terrorist 
warnings all carried a listing o f places people could find more information, but the later 
messages dropped this useful strategy. People need to be assured the government is 
doing all it can to protect them in the crisis and that they aren’t alone. They want to 
know who can help them and how they can help others. All press releases should carry
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relevant listings o f support agencies and locations o f additional information for the 
audience.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The study’s findings show that Department o f Homeland Seeurity uses traditional 
framing approaches in constructing its messages, but also identified other content and 
language issues. It seems reasonable that these omissions of important information and 
politically loaded wording contribute to agency mistrust and allow partisans to question 
the motives behind issuing threat warnings. Fortunately, none o f these issues are 
particularly difficult to correct and, in fact, much of the material needed to support their 
messages already exists on government websites.
DHS clearly needs to rethink how it constructs terrorist warning messages. While the 
eolor-coded National Threat Level might be a valuable tool at an organizational level, it 
isn’t an effective substitute for conveying risk probability to people. DHS also needs to 
be more precise when identifying terrorist threats in press releases. Vague warnings 
might actually cause more harm than good and the certainly have the potential to damage 
agency credibility.
Also, flowing patriotic/propaganda concepts like “American spirit”, “be vigilant and 
ignore rumors”, or how “resolute and indivisible” we are as a nation are better left for 
political speeches and not press releases warning o f possible terrorist attacks. Emotional 
appeals, like patriotic messages, can distract attention away from important details 
contained in the message. The cosmopolitan nature o f the audience must always be
33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
considered when drafting a new message. Anything that can be construed negatively by 
political opponents should be avoided or the agency risks alienating them from the 
warning.
The findings also justify the development o f a method to construct and evaluate 
messages that deal with uncertainty. By having an instrument to gauge the message’s 
content, the study not only found the expected issues, but also illuminated other problems. 
Although the method used here proved useful, it’s still a crude beginning, and the author 
encourages recommendations for refinement.
Future efforts should focus on improving and testing the instrument. Using a 
quantitative measurement, like a five or seven point Likert scale, in gauging message 
clarity might be a more rigorous test for the instrument. Messages should be created 
using the worksheet guidelines and compared to traditional risk messages through focus 
groups. Also, the applicability o f the instrument to other case studies o f should be 
considered. Perhaps the method could be used to create messages designed to increase 
stakeholder understanding o f scientific reports or improving the general population’s 
understanding o f controversial issues. Semi-technical periodicals like “Popular Science” 
and “Popular Mechanics” seem more capable o f reporting uncertainty and evaluating 
their content might provide useful research.
The discussion about communicating uncertainty has been going on for years, but 
reporters still have difficulty effectively addressing it. While a number o f organizational 
and editorial obstacles will likely remain, giving journalist an effective framework to 
convey a better understanding o f uncertainty is a start. Most of the weaknesses identified 
in the DHS messages could be corrected with better word choices and by including some
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additional information they had readily available. This seems to indicate merely a lack of 
understanding on their part, and is something current research can improve. By defining 
what the framework of uncertainty reporting should look like, researchers can give 
journalists the tool they need to inform the public. Now, researchers just need to find 
something they can agree will work.
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APPENDIX B
New Threat: Public address to reporters about anthrax cases, October 22, 2001. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 




Identify Threat: Anthrax in the mail
Identify Location: Brentwood Post Office, Washington D C.
Identify Duration: Ongoing
Identify Population Threatened: Postal workers, medical personel 
Clarity: Good 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: No, “weaponized anthrax”
Clarity: Vague 
Give the threat context:
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Minimize Exposure: Wear protective clothing 
When Exposed: None 
Other’s Actions: Screening/sanitizing mail 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None 
Get More Info: USPS.gov, CDC.gov 
Intercoder Reliability: a= 0.98
Discussion: Comparison to yearly flu outbreak and its 10,000 deaths was confusing. 
Comparison to 9/11 attacks seemed out o f place.
New Threat: Public address to reporters about a general terrorist threat, December 3, 
2001 .
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 




Identify Threat: “Shadow soldiers” attacking Americans 
Identify Location: US and abroad 
Identify Duration: Through the holidays 
Identify Population Threatened: Americans 
Clarity: Vague
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Explain what the threat means;
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Vague 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: 9/11 attacks 
Clarity: Good 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be aware and mindful o f suspicious activity 
When Exposed: Contact authorities 
Other’s Actions: Increased security by officials 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: Nation is at war 
Get More Info: None 
Clarity: None 
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.98
Discussion: Very vague specifics with a lot o f political rhetoric.
New Threat: Press release for a general terrorist threat, February 7, 2003. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Top intelligence advisors
Context: None
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Clarity; None 
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorists attacks on Americans 
Identify Location: US and abroad 
Identify Duration: None 
Identify Population Threatened: Americans 
Clarity: Vague 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Vague 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: None 
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: Federal and state officials increasing security 
Clarity: None 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None 
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Discussion: Very vague on specifics.
New Threat: Press release about Operation Liberty Shield, March 17, 2003. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 




Identify Threat: WMD attacks by terrorists
Identify Location: Military bases, transportation, infrastructure, symbols o f US 
Identify Duration: None 
Identify Population Threatened: Americans 
Clarity: Vague 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Vague 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be aware and prepared 
When Exposed: None
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o th er’s Actions: Increased security, public health sector on alert 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: All state governors assisting DHS 
Get More Info: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.98
Discussion: The WMD aspects mimicked pre-war intelligence posturing.
New Threat: Public address to reporters about Operation Liberty Shield, March 18, 2003. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 




Identify Threat: Terrorist trying to harm Americans 
Identify Location: Chemical/food plants, borders, everywhere 
Identify Duration: From now until DHS changes it 
Identify Population Threatened: Americans 
Clarity: Vague 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
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Clarity: Vague 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be informed, report suspicious activity, ignore rumors 
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: More security by federal and state govt.
Clarity: Vague 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: All travelers can expect delays 
Get More Info: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.95
Discussion: Very vague message. Mitigation efforts suffered from “ignore rumors” 
political statement.
New Threat: Press release in the wake o f terrorist bombings. May 20, 2003. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
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Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorists either armed, using car bombs, or WMDs. 
Identify Loeation: Large public gatherings 
Identify Duration: None
Identify Population Threatened: Large crowds o f people 
Clarity: Vague 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Vague 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Vigilance, report suspicious activity 
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies increasing security 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: All o f us working together can make a differenee 
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Discussion: Very mixed messages to warn people about an imminent attack and then tell 
them to go about their normal messages.
New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Isabel, September 15, 2003.
Determine the threat potential :
Risk Probability: None 





Identify Location: Mid-Atlantic east coast
Identify Duration: Landfall Thursday
Identify Population Threatened: People at location and inland 
Clarity: Good 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Monitor TV/radio for info, prepare supplies for 3 days
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When Exposed: Listen to official announcements 
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies will be on hand to help 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None 
Get More Info: None 
Clarity: None 
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.95
Discussion: A hurricane probably is the most common threat they have experienced.
New Threat: Public address to reporters about holiday attack, December 21, 2003. 
Determine the threat potential :
Risk Probability: None 
Method Used: Increased terrorist chatter 
Context: Rival or exceed 9/11 
Clarity: Good 
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorist using aircraft as weapons 
Identify Location: Urban areas 
Identify Duration: Holiday season and beyond 
Identify Population Threatened: Everyone 
Clarity: Vague 
Explain what the threat means:
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Terms Explained; No 
Clarity: Vague 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: 9/11 attacks 
Clarity: Good 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Vigilance and emergency plans, report suspicious activity 
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies increasing security 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: Thanks for putting up with travel delays 
Get More Info: No 
Clarity: Vague 
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.95
Discussion: Mixed messages again, warning o f airplane attacks on urban areas and 
telling people to go ahead with holiday plans.
New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Charley, August 13, 2004.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 
Method Used: Storm tracking 
Context: None
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Clarity; Vague 
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Hurricane 
Identify Loeation: Florida coast 
Identify Duration: Landfall soon 
Identify Population Threatened: People in Florida 
Clarity: Good 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Prepare supplies and listen to officials 
When Exposed: Listen to officials
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies will be helping 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None 
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Discussion;
New Threat: Public address to reporters about the threat to financial sectors, August 1, 
2004.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 




Identify Threat: Terrorist with a ear bomb
Identify Location: IMF, Worldbank, Prudential, Citigroup and NYSE 
Identify Duration: Until after the election
Identify Population Threatened: People in and around financial buildings 
Clarity: Good 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: No 
Clarity: Yes 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be vigilant 
When Exposed: None
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Other’s Actions: Security increased at the locations 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: “American spirit” “Can’t dampen our resolve” “Indivisible” 
Get More Info: None 
Clarity: Vague 
Intereoder Reliability: a=0.96
Discussion: Mixed messages again warning o f a car bomb attack, but telling people to 
ignore the threat and go about their business. The patriotic hyperbole might be 
considered propaganda by some.
New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Frances, September 3, 2004.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 





Identify Location: Florida and Georgia
Identify Duration: Landfall soon
Identify Population Threatened: People in the two states 
Clarity: Good
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Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be prepared with supplies 
When Exposed: Listen to officials
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies will all be helping 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None 
Get More Info: Yes 
Clarity: Vague 
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.99 
Discussion:
New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Ivan, September 16, 2004. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 
Method Used: Storm tracking 
Context: None
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Clarity; Vague 
Report the threat;
Identify Threat: Hurricane 
Identify Location; Georgia, Florida, Alabama 
Identify Duration: Landfall soon 
Identify Population Threatened: People in those states 
Clarity: Good 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Head all official warnings, be prepared 
When Exposed: Follow official instructions
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies will all be there to help 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None 
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Discussion:
New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Jeanne, September 24, 2004. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 




Identify Threat: Hurricane 
Identify Location: Florida 
Identify Duration: Weekend landfall 
Identify Population Threatened: People in Florida 
Clarity: Good 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Follow warnings from officials, prepare for storm 
When Exposed: Visit staging areas for food, water, shelter and first aid
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Other’s Actions: Thousands o f federal and state workers will be helping 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None 
Get More Info: Yes 
Clarity: Vague 
Intercoder Reliability: a=1.0 
Diseussion:
New Threat: Public address to reporters after London bombings, July 7, 2005. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None




Identify Threat: Terrorist attack on US mass transit systems 
Identify Location: Could be anywhere 
Identify Duration: Short term 
Identify Population Threatened: Mass transit users 
Clarity: Vague 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
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Clarity: Vague 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be aware o f surroundings when traveling 
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: Increased security at mass transit sites 
Clarity: Vague 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: “America stands with Britain”
Get More Info: None 
Clarity: Vague 
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.94
Discussion: Mixed messages, again. After warning o f the potential attack. Secretary 
Chertoff stressed that mass transit was safe and not to be afraid to use it.
New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Ophelia, September 14, 2005.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 
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Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Hurricane 
Identify Location: North Carolina and East Coast 
Identify Duration: Landfall soon 
Identify Population Threatened: People in those areas 
Clarity: Good 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Obey mandatory evacuations and have 3 days o f supplies 
When Exposed: Follow instructions from local authorities 
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies all prepared to help 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: All o f North Carolina under “State o f Emergency”
Get More Info: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.98 
Discussion:
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New Threat; Press release about Hurricane Rita, September 20, 2005. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 




Identify Threat: Hurricane 
Identify Location: Texas gulf region 
Identify Duration: Landfall soon 
Identify Population Threatened: People in the area 
Clarity: Good 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Listen to state officials 
When Exposed: Listen to state officials 
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies ready to help 
Clarity: Good
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Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None 
Get More Info: None 
Clarity: None 
Intereoder Reliability: a=0.98 
Discussion: Very vague for a hurrieane warning.
New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Wilma, October 21, 2005. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None 




Identify Threat: Hurricane 
Identify Location: Florida and Gulf Coast 
Identify Duration: Going into the weekend 
Identify Population Threatened: People o f the region 
Clarity: Good 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Good 
Give the threat context:
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Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be prepared with supplies and evacuation plan 
When Exposed: Follow official instructions 
Other’s Actions: Huge listing o f agencies and where to get help 
Clarity: Good 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None 
Get More Info: Yes 
Clarity: Vague 
Intereoder Reliability: a=0.98 
Discussion: Best press release o f the bunch.
New Threat: Press release changing aviation threat level, August 10, 2006. 
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None




Identify Threat: Terrorist attacks on flights from UK to US and all US flights 
Identify Location: Those flights
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Identify Duration; 4am until they change it (this threat alert still in effect)
Identify Population Threatened: Passengers on the flights 
Clarity: Vague 
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes 
Clarity: Vague 
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None 
Clarity: None 
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be vigilant when flying 
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: Raised security at airports and banned gels 
Clarity: Vague 
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: US and UK resolute 
Get More Info: None 
Clarity: Vague 
Intereoder Reliability: a=0.98
Discussion: Mixed messages, again. Raised the threat level to red, but then stated there 
was no clear threat and to continue flying.
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